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Abstract 
The latest emergence of influenza A (H1N1) virus outbreak demonstrated how swiftly a new strain of flu can evolve and spread around the globe. 
The A/H1N1 flu has been spreading at unprecedented speed, and further spread within the countries being affected and to other adjacent or far 
way countries is considered inevitable due to the rapid emigration of infected individuals across the world.  In this bioinformation, we discuss the 
mechanism of evolution of a new HxNy strain and the essential criteria for potentially breaking the outbreak of these extremely harmful and 
rapidly evolving viral strains in the near future by taking the recent H1N1 pandemic as a classical paradigm.  
 
Key Words: Influenza A, HxNy, H1N1, Pandemic, Outbreak 
 
Background: 
The emergence of influenza A (H1N1) 9 decades ago led to a 
devastating global pandemic. H1N1 is thought to have emerged almost 
simultaneously from birds into humans and swine [1]. As of July 23, 
2009, the H1N1 virus was reported in more than 130 countries, with 
more than 800 deaths. Several countries are experiencing sustainable 
community transmission. The sudden outbreak of this novel flu virus 
has tested the world’s public health preparedness. H1N1 provided a 
real-world test that showed the strengths and vulnerabilities in the 
abilities of the countries in world to respond to a major infectious 
disease outbreak [2]. The scale of the problem is uncertain when a 
disease first appears but increased rapidly. Pandemic preparations will 
be severely challenged when the pandemic eventually arrives to 
countries, especially if there is high morbidity and mortality. 
Healthcare facilities can be quickly overwhelmed and the economy 
can go into deep recession. There can be widespread public anxiety 
and fear. It is thus vital to ensure that preparedness plans are regularly 
reviewed and updated to incorporate the latest research findings and 
technology where feasible. Equally important are exercises to test and 
fine-tune procedures and plans. The consequences of H1N1 have been 
less severe than originally anticipated, but there are some important 
lessons to be learned. Should the worst occur, most countries would be 
caught without the necessary policies and plans in place to deal with a 
deadly outbreak. Early pandemic preparation is required, but decisions 
about action must be made when the threat is only modest. Major 
intervention may cause such as rare adverse events from large-scale 
vaccination or economic and social costs from school dismissals and 
the uncertain probability of much greater harm from a widespread 
outbreak. This combination of urgency, uncertainty, and the costs of 
interventions makes the effort to control infectious diseases especially 
difficult [3]. This bioinformation examines underlying concerns and 
lessons learned from the response about overall preparedness for 
potential pandemic flu outbreak in the event that H1N1 returns in the 
future, either in its current form or as a more virulent strain.  
 
HxNy Pandemic and Social preparedness: 
If a severe pandemic occurs, it is likely to be a prolonged and 
widespread outbreak that could require major changes in many sectors 
of society, such as schools, work, transportation, business, health care, 
and government. The public can greatly reduce their risk during a 
pandemic by being informed and prepared before the emergency.  
 
Social isolation:  
Nonmedical interventions primarily social distancing could be useful 
in staving off transmission [4]. Limiting social contact will slow the 
spread of influenza in the community and will reduce the height of the 
peak of the epidemic, although overall attack rates may remain the 
same. This will help healthcare services to cope and minimize the 
likelihood that healthcare services would be overwhelmed. Social 
distancing measures will take the form of closure of all educational 
institutions and most public places e.g. shopping malls, cinemas and 
swimming pools. Public gatherings at mass events such as concerts 
and sporting events will also be cancelled. Schools and corporate finds 
more ways to be flexible with their work-from-home options [5]. 
 
Delaying the spread of HxNy: 
At the earliest sign that an influenza pandemic has begun (Figure 1), 
border controls would be stepped up in an attempt to delay the spread 
of the pandemic virus. It has been reported that such measures may 
have limited usefulness but measures such as temperature and health 
screening were used during the SARS epidemic were so effective and 
it is good to be employed again during an influenza pandemic [6]. 
Depending on the severity of the pandemic, other border control 
measures that could be implemented include the imposition of 
immigration visa requirements and quarantine of incoming travelers, 
including residents. These would minimize non-essential travels [7]. 
 
Planning and management:  
Improving coordination among governments and the private sector 
preparedness and planning activities are critical in future preparation 
as the nature of flu threats change over time. Communication between 
the public health system and health providers must be well 
coordinated. Building trust, technologies, and policies internationally 
to encourage science-based, consistent decision making across 
globally during an outbreak is very important. 
 
Super-flexible response strategy:  
As the epidemic unfolded, new knowledge required government 
officials to reassess guidance offered to the public and the medical 
community. Providing clear, straightforward information to the public 
is essential for allaying fears and building trust gives people the facts 
they need to be prepared, not scared. 
 
Maintaining indispensable services: 
Improving the ability for health providers to manage a massive influx 
of patients is essential. Even with a mild outbreak, the health care 
delivery system was overwhelmed. It revealed significant problems 
and lack of preparedness. Investments in antiviral stockpiles and 
enhanced vaccine manufacturing capacity also proved to be prudent. 
Countries need to make sure that they have enough stockpiles of food 
essentials such as rice and infant milk powder. Bioinformation   open access 
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Figure 1: Mechanism of HxNy Evolution. Influenza virus A subtypes, belongs to the family of orthomyxoviridae, are classified as H1N1, 
H1N2, H3N2 or H1N5 etc., based on 16 Hemaglutinin (H) serotypes or subtypes (imputed for x variable)  and from 9 subtypes of neuraminidase 
(N) (imputed for y variable) on the viral surface. However, the specific influenza strain isolates are identified by a standard nomenclature 
specifying virus type, geographical location where first isolated, sequential number of isolation, year of isolation, and also the HA and NA 
subtypes. (A) Without any genetic modification influenza A virus can be passed on to humans. (B) Birds or aquatic birds can also spread 
influenza A subtypes directly to pigs. (C) Pigs, which are one of the intermediate hosts as birds can pass on the virus to humans. (D)However, 
inside an intermediate host like pig, a bird influenza virus can be genetically mixed with a human strain of influenza virus subtype since humans 
can transmit the virus directly to pigs (E) causing the evolution of a new virulent strain of influenza which might infect the humans to cause an 
epidemic (F) and further spreading of this new strain in different human populations across the globe will eventually lead to a full fledged flu 
pandemic (G). 
 
Trade limitations:  
There is no scientific evidence that eating pork causes influenza. Yet 
20 countries have banned meat from Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States, including 2 of the world’s largest pork importers, China and 
Russia. However, more scientific evidence required whether such bans 
are necessary to implement during pandemic outbreak. 
 
Pandemic drills:  
Government agencies have to carry out exercises to test their pandemic 
preparedness plans. The exercise will be useful in enabling healthcare 
providers to fine-tune their operational plans for an influenza 
pandemic. As seen for the past few weeks, social media such as 
twitter, blogs and social networks, can play a vital role in the 
dissemination of information.  A public exhibition on infectious 
diseases, including flu pandemics will raise public consciousness 
about the impact of major epidemics and the need for tough measures 
to be taken. 
 
 
Additional procedures:  
Other measures include public advice on good personal hygiene such 
as good cough etiquette and frequent washing of hands. The public 
could also be advised to stay home as much as possible and wear 
surgical masks whenever they are in public places including when 
travelling on public transportation. Members of households with 
influenza cases will be asked to practice voluntary home quarantine to 
prevent possible transmission. Useful lessons were learnt during SARS 
such as transparency and the provision of regular updated information 
as well as gene expression profiling data from the SARS patients 
which are essential to design a novel treatment regimen for containing 
the outbreak [8, 9]. Another lesson is that just because SARS started in 
Asia doesn’t mean the next bug will be born there. A potential 
pandemic can originate and take root anywhere [10]. 
 
Pandemic flu and medical preparedness 
The emergence of yet another serious global health threat from an 
animal source highlights the critical need for deeper understanding of 
zoonotic viruses, including in vivo studies of pathogenesis in animals, Bioinformation   open access 
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field epidemiologic studies, and surveillance in animal populations, 
along with the development of computational models. The shift in 
mortality toward younger age groups was the most striking 
characteristic of the 20th-century pandemics [11, 12]. Data from past 
pandemics can provide useful insights for current and future planning 
[13]. Though the rapidity of transmission of influenza virus during 
pandemics necessitates immediate action, it can be hoped that close 
collaborations and lessons drawn from previous pandemics will 
contribute to reducing national and global mortality. The documented 
relevant signature features can help health authorities prioritize 
national strategies and aid international collaborators in addressing the 
initial and successive waves of illnesses and deaths. 
 
National stockpile:  
Maintaining enough stockpiles to make sure enough antiviral 
medications, vaccinations, and equipment are available to protect 
people. During the SARS epidemic in 2003, personal protective 
equipment (PPE) such as masks, gloves and waterproof gowns were in 
short supply. 
 
Prophylaxis for health care professional: 
 It is important to make sure that there is sufficient medication 
provided in advance to front-line health care professionals. For 
example, doctors and their staffs might need numerous 10-day courses 
of antiviral for them to continue treating patients for the duration of a 
pandemic without getting sick. Workers in essential services such as 
healthcare, energy supply, water supply, and law enforcement will be 
provided prophylaxis with oseltamivir to minimize their likelihood of 
being infected with influenza.  
 
HxNy research initiatives: 
 Providing enough funding for the future research on H1N1 is very 
important Identification of pre-1918 human influenza RNA samples 
would help us understand the timing of emergence of the 1918 virus. 
Understanding influenza pandemics in general requires understanding 
the 1918 pandemic in all its historical, epidemiologic, and biologic 
aspects [14]. It is also important to enhance the biomedical research 
and development abilities to rapidly develop and produce a vaccine. 
 
Case definition and testing methods:  
Countries have reported that the clinical case definition was not an 
accurate model for the swine flu epidemic; and drug and mask 
distribution has been extremely slow, especially to general 
practitioners, who are crucial to effective disease management and 
containment [15]. Initial laboratory testing to confirm a case of swine 
flu was only allowed if a sick patient has been recently returned from 
affected countries. This is the opposite of what has occurred. To 
understand the full extent of disease spread, widespread testing 
without assumptions needs to occur so that the accuracy of the 
proposed case definition can be tested.  
 
Drug resistance and alternative therapy:  
It is shown that the main seasonal influenza strain in the United States 
in 2008 was resistant to oseltamivir in 0.4 percent to 4 percent of 
adults and children treated [16]. The real nightmare scenario will be if 
the current swine flu strain also develops resistance in the face of 
widespread use of oseltamivir, leaving us with few treatment options.  
 
Conclusion: 
The documented relevant signature features can help health authorities 
prioritize national strategies and aid international collaborators in 
addressing the initial and successive waves of illnesses and deaths.   
The recent H1N1 Influenza outbreak raised concerns about our ability 
to handle the current and future pandemic threats. Our systems for 
surveillance, reporting, infection control, and antiviral drug 
distribution showed strain and could potentially be overwhelmed. In 
the brief time we have to prepare for our next wave, we must step back 
and evaluate where improvements need to be made. Preparations must 
continue to be improved and fine-tuned to ensure that the impact of the 
future influenza pandemic is minimized as much as possible. It is 
important to plan for the constant evolution of H1N1 virus. H1N1 may 
transform into a deadly global threat at some point, debilitating normal 
life across the world. Countries must heed the lessons of this scare and 
recognize that preparedness in the present is essential. By 
implementing comprehensive policies and investigating the strengths 
and weaknesses before any real crisis hits, we can ensure a relatively 
smooth transition into a state of emergency, should they be faced with 
the worst. Though the rapidity of transmission of influenza virus 
during pandemics necessitates immediate action, it can be hoped that 
close collaborations and lessons drawn from the recent H1N1 
pandemic will contribute to reducing national and global mortality. 
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